Abstracts

Maps, Predication, and Alien Languages

Matti Eklund (Uppsala)

Tuesday, 09:40–11:00

Here is a deep question. Can there be languages structurally different from familiar ones – alien languages? Might the metaphysical structure of reality be better captured by some such language? Or might such alien languages for other reasons serve some of our purposes better than familiar languages do? This deep question is clearly tied to conceptual engineering. One central thought behind conceptual engineering is that the concepts we find ourselves with are just some of all the possible concepts there are, and other concepts may be better for various purposes Maybe among the possible concepts are concepts expressed by expressions of an alien language. Maybe we should use some such concepts for some purposes.

In the talk, I will discuss a particular strategy regarding how to make progress on the issue of whether here can be alien languages: that of taking inspiration from what some theorists have said regarding pictorial and cartographic representation. In some recent discussions, e.g. Elisabeth Camp’s “Why Maps are Not Propositional”, it has been claimed that maps have a different sort of content from ordinary linguistic representations, and theorists have sought to describe just how maps differ. In particular, it has been claimed that maps do not employ predication. I will consider whether ideas from this discussion might help make sense of what an alien language might be like.

In the first half of the talk I will explain in more detail what I mean here by “alien language”; in the second half I turn to the question of whether the discussion of maps might be of help.

Conceptual Engineering, Language Use and the Neutral Implementation Challenge

Delia Belleri (Lisbon)

Tuesday, 11:30–12:50

Conceptual engineering projects have been targeted by the so-called “implementation challenge”. One of its most popular formulations comes from Herman Cappelen, who spells out the challenge from the point of view of both externalist and internalist metasemantic theories, which are in turn understood as supervenience theories. If these supervenience theories were false, however, the challenge would not go away. This implies that there must be a way of formulating the implementation challenge that is neutral (or as neutral as possible) with respect to specific metasemantic options. In this paper, I articulate the implementation challenge by appealing solely to language use, and I identify it in terms of an “uptake problem”. I note that the uptake problem is not eluded by purported ways of addressing the implementation challenge that focus on “local” or “micro” aspects, for example speaker meaning, contextual meaning modulation, context-bound or stimulus-bound patterns of behaviour and language use. I also explore and assess some ways in which implementers can influence uptake, suggesting moderate optimism regarding how the implementation challenge can be overcome.

In Praise of Morally Objectionable Artworks

Sai Ying Ng (CUNY)

Tuesday, 14:00–14:45

Immoralism holds that an artwork can be aesthetically praiseworthy in virtue of its unethical perspective, manifested thorough prescribing certain attitudes towards its diegetic elements. When an artwork prescribes attitudes that contradict how we think we ought to evaluate what is represented, doing so in a way that is essential to our understanding of the artwork, the artwork’s perspective is an unethical one.

Immoralism is often thought to hinge on the possibility that we can adopt attitudes contrary to our own ethical perspectives, e.g., to see a brutal act as good, or an act of kindness as bad. Our appraisal of an artwork’s perspective as unethical, however, is dependent on dominant perspectives and values within our moral-epistemic context. This paper argues that artworks can be aesthetically praiseworthy given their moral-epistemic value in highlighting inadequacies in our moral-epistemic context. Using the example of Lolita, I define its status as a morally objectionable artwork through its use of objectionable thick ethical concepts such as ‘nymphet’. I then argue that its use of ‘nymphet’ explains both its aesthetic success and the unethical perspective reflected in its use of an objectionable thick ethical concept. Insofar as its use of objectionable thick ethical concepts can highlight such inadequacies in our moral-epistemic context, Lolita is aesthetically praiseworthy.

A Portrait of the Artist as a Conceptual Engineer

Elizabeth Cantalamessa (Miami)

Tuesday, 14:45–15:30

In this talk I explore how our practices of art appreciation and classification help clarify both the object and activity of conceptual engineering. Some philosophers are skeptical that conceptual engineering is a distinct or legitimate philosophical methodology in part because individual speakers do not have the relevant degree of control over the semantic and metasemantic determinants for our public terms and phrases. Lightweight conceptual engineers counter this objection by insisting that conceptual engineering is a practical affair that involves changing how people use a term or terms (speaker-meaning), instead of abstract entities like semantic meaning or reference. According to the lightweight theorist, actually changing speaker-meaning is relatively straightforward: it involves persuasive reasoning, often articulating the problems with existing concepts (or their function) and/or communicating the benefits of using an engineered concept (e.g., adopting a revisionist concept of ‘woman’ will help improve the conditions of actual women). Consider this to be the “debate” model of conceptual engineering: implementation primarily involves convincing people that one’s proposal will lead to better consequences.

However people do not typically change what concepts they use on the basis of the consequences of doing so. I will contrast the debate model of conceptual engineering with what I’ll call the “artist” model. According to the artist model of conceptual engineering, the processes of metasemantic deliberation that underlie changes in our terms and categories (such as ‘science fiction’ or ‘sculpture’) are caused by feelings rather than reasons. Art causes experiences like bewilderment, confusion, discomfort, and even frustration that give rise to metasemantic reflection and deliberation. Artists need not have an intention to change particular concepts in their audiences, but their artworks support the imaginative capacities involved in conceptual change, such as counterfactual reasoning. Art classification and appreciation are inherently historical and humanist enterprises: which terms are appropriate for a given art kind or work depends on what art has been and will be because that is what we care about when we care about art. Successful artistic creation is compatible with individual lack of control and the artist model suggests a much narrower scope for any given project in conceptual engineering: it is unpredictable whether a work of art will be successful and art does not aim to be universally intelligible.

Functions, Normativity, and Conceptual Engineering

A.W. Eaton (Chicago)

16:00–17:20

At the heart of any conceptual engineering project lies function. Whether you are in the business of fixing a concept or in the business of creating one de novo, an idea of what the concept does or should do must guide the project. In this paper I'll exactly which conception of function is at play here, and then I'll discuss aesthetic functions and conceptual engineering of the concept art.

The Abandonment of ‘Art’

Herman Cappelen (Hong Kong)

Wednesday, 09:40–11:00

Some concepts are so defective that they cannot be improved and should instead be abandoned. A Theory of Abandonment is an account of what abandonment consists in and when it is appropriate. In this talk I outline a theory of Abandonment and then apply it to the concept Art. Art, I argue, should be abandoned: it is defective and we can easily do better.

Descriptive vs. Ameliorative Projects in Aesthetics

Esa Díaz-León (Barcelona)

Wednesday, 11:30–12:50

Descriptive projects in philosophy aim to reveal the ordinary concepts that we associate with our terms, whereas ameliorative projects in philosophy aim to figure out the terms and concepts that we should employ for different aims and purposes. In this talk I will provide an account of the nature of both descriptive and ameliorative projects, and I will argue that both sorts of projects have to appeal to normative considerations. I will conclude that even projects in descriptive conceptual analysis have to invoke normative considerations in order to settle the debates.

Everyday Aesthetics as Conceptual Engineering

Ariane Nomikos (Buffalo)

Wednesday, 14:00–14:45

This paper examines the social mission with which Yuriko Saito tasks the discipline of everyday aesthetics in her most recent book, Aesthetics of the Familiar: Everyday Life and World-Making (2017). Because aesthetic considerations are embedded within the fabric of everyday life in a way that shapes our thoughts and compels us to act or refrain from acting, they have the power to influence, and sometimes even determine, the course of our lives and the state of the world. In light of this, Saito calls on the discipline to expose the power of the aesthetic and harness it toward better world-making, thereby steering the discourse in a normative direction. After briefly considering what this normative task entails, I suggest reframing Saito’s call for an aesthetic paradigm shift in terms of conceptual engineering and situating it alongside other revisionist projects in philosophy. Doing so helps us better understand what is at stake in moving the everyday aesthetics discourse in a normative direction, while providing an entry point for the fruitful exchange between everyday aesthetics and other philosophical subdisciplines. Those interested in furthering the social mission of everyday aesthetics through something like conceptual engineering, for instance, can look to other revisionist projects for insight into which ameliorative strategies are more likely to succeed. Moreover, the everyday aesthetics literature has shed invaluable light on the powerful and pervasive role the aesthetic plays in our everyday lives. This is good indication that aesthetics might have a key role to play in the success of conceptual engineering projects more generally, something other normative discourses would do well to take seriously.

Disrupting Beauty

Nadia Mehdi (Sheffield) 

Wednesday, 14:45–15:30

Heather Widdows has recently argued that global beauty standards are coalescing into a single aesthetic ideal (requiring women to be thin, firm, smooth and youthful), and at the same time an ethical imperative. Beauty, she argues, is emerging as a standard against which we judge the goodness of both ourselves, and others. If the picture painted by Widdows is correct then it seems that something needs to be done about the concept of beauty and the norms that it currently prescribes. In this paper I will consider two modes of aesthetic resistance to beauty’s conceptual domination as it currently stands. Both movements have received scant philosophical attention but exist as grassroots attempts to practice conceptual engineering.

The first strategy I will consider involves a reconceptualization of beauty, a diversification of the ideal. Proponents of this strategy often refer to this as the concept of body positivity. The second strategy I will consider involves a radical rethinking of the kinds of concepts we might want to apply to women’s bodies, and introduces the concept body neutrality.  Body neutrality encourages a neutral attitude towards one’s body, rather than a cultivation of a positive attitude towards it.

I will argue that the best approach to disrupting beauty’s supremacy will be a concept that combines both the other-directed nature of body positivity and the beyond-beauty nature of body neutrality.

Waltfiction as a Theoretical Construct

Stacie Friend (Birkbeck)

Tuesday, 16:00–17:20

It is well-known that Kendall Walton's category of fictions, defined by their function as props in games of make-believe, does not line up with ordinary classifications. For example, it encompasses many texts we ordinarily call 'non-fiction' as well as all pictures. This is no reason to criticise Walton, however; he is not interested in analysing our ordinary concept of fiction. His account should instead be construed as an instance of (what he elsewhere calls) 'theory construction', delineating a new category of (what I call) 'waltfiction'. In this paper I consider the explanatory value of this approach.