By Suman Gupta

Definitional conundrum

The study of ‘political catchwords’ involves some delicate methodological negotiations with definitions. I am thinking of this as encountering a definitional conundrum, which goes as follows.

On the one hand: the very initiation of any study in an academic mould comes with a demand for defining terms. Whenever I have broached the theme with colleagues, made a presentation, etc. there’s this demand: what is the definition of ‘political catchwords’? Once a definition is formulated, the study proceeds on its basis – everything scholarly becomes possible.

The formulation of a definition has an appearance:

• it opens with some such words as ‘a political catchword is …’ or ‘by political catchwords we mean …’;
• it is a short statement, which means it is perceived as short (how short is short?);
• the formulation has some relationship with what might already be anticipated if one were to encounter the phrase ‘political catchwords’;
• the formulation seems widely if not universally applicable.  

Often, a definition involves taking stock of other definitions of the term in question and carving a formulation out of them – or accepting one of them. Once that’s done, the study follows a path of departures and returns to the adopted definition. It is assumed that the study of political catchwords would proceed by being anchored to the defined stability of its own terms. As students, we don’t pause often on the nuances of, so to speak, doing defining – we just go ahead and do the defining.

On the other hand: the study of political catchwords involves tracking shifting definitions of such catchwords (including scholarly ones) in different contexts without necessarily going along with any one of them. A studious examination of the catchword ‘austerity’, for instance, would consider its catchy qualities and passages by, among other devices, consulting the numerous academic definitions that have appeared at different junctures. Such definitions are taken as evidence for shifts in and adaptations of the term ‘austerity’ rather than being accepted as anchoring devices for the study of austerity.

As students, we do defining as a methodological necessity and an anchoring and stabilizing step that then holds together the process of scholarly investigation. At the same time, we examine others’ definitions as objects of enquiry which are contingent and need to be contextualised, interpreted, and usually understood as ideologically loaded expressions.

That tension between doing and examining definitions is where I think a definitional conundrum appears. It doesn’t appear in all kinds of studies. Most could simply define and proceed with their enquiries without pausing interrogatively on the business of defining. But for a study of political catchwords -- or for that matter any study of words as objects of enquiry -- definitions are both assumed and at stake.

That there’s such a definitional conundrum doesn’t mean that the study of political catchphrases cannot proceed regardless. But it does make one think.    

A definition is …

Of course, as a bona fide student I should be able to do that: I should be able to just do a definition of ‘definition’ that seems generally valid and works for studying political catchwords. Here’s a stab at doing that.

A definition is an attempt to contain the fluidity of a given word or set phrase in everyday language usage to facilitate a collective purpose.

In everyday language usage, words may be used with local variations, misused, played with, reassigned, de/reformed, etc. – hence, fluid. Definitions are attempts at containing this fluidity because they may or may not succeed in enabling collective purposes in a sustained way. That could be because:

• the definition is unequal to the scale and scope of the collective purpose,
• the purpose is collectively modified,
• the terms in relation to which and with which the given word in defined have changed,
• fluidity in everyday usage simply refuses to be contained and renders the definition inadequate.

This definition of ‘definition’ could be honed further by clarifying the types of collective purposes that definitions serve. The following seem to be the main ones:

• The collective purpose is the standardization of everyday usage to establish the cohesiveness of a language domain, especially where that coincides with the jurisdiction of a political authority. This appears to be the principal rationale for word definitions in general language dictionaries (usually alongside standardizing syntax).
• The collective purpose is establishing professional standards and regularizing professional practices (such as, for legal, commercial, technical areas). This is the rationale of professional and specialist dictionary definitions. In this, we may also include glossaries which support institutional bureaucratic functioning, often in a localised way (as in definitions of policy or conduct terms).
• The collective purpose is the systematic development of knowledge with the expectation that such knowledge will garner wide consensus. That’s the kind of definition this essay is concerned with: definitions that enable the rigorous study of a theme or an object. The rationale for such definitions may overlap with those of the previous two purposes but is nevertheless distinct. Definitions appear to be less regulatory and more searching here. Perhaps it is in the nature of such defining that definitional conundrums – when encountered -- are productive rather than debilitating. Let me call this kind of definitive formulation scholarly definition.

The scholarly study of definition

The distinctiveness of scholarly definitions is worth underlining. General language dictionary definitions and professional definitions establish a baseline for standardized and regulated usage to follow – the thrust is to establish consensually accepted usage for a pragmatic process. Terms may need to be redefined and updated as ordinary usage and professions change, but that too proceeds with the thrust of establishing a consensually accepted baseline of definitions. In scholarly work, definitions do not necessarily assert or ground consensual acceptance. Scholarly work usually proceeds by testing and questioning definitions on offer, proposing other or new definitions, considering multiple definitions. Changing and proliferating definitions are productive of scholarship itself and are intrinsic to the process of continuing scholarship.

In that sense, all scholarship could be regarded as an immense conversation anchored to the practice of continuously defining. Or, all knowledge could be considered as advancing around nodes and networks of definitions and redefinitions. Defining constantly is so endemic to the scholarly process that when scholarly attention turns to defining definitions a precipice of regression opens up and feats of intellectual prowess are demanded.  

One recourse for the scholarly defining of definition itself has been to begin with what are regarded as foundational steps in knowledge formation, i.e., to consider how definitions were conceived in certain originary junctures of knowledge formation … and then carry on from there. This is taken up occasionally for different lines of knowledge production; for instance, by starting with Aristotle, Plato, and Hellenic philosophers (Deslauriers 2007, Charles ed. 2010, Clark 2022), with Indian Nyaya philosophy brought into the picture (Chakrabarti 1995), or tracing Islamic traditions (Kennedy-Day 2003). These effectively offer historicist perspectives on scholarly definition. They are reckonings with the concept of definition which decentre present-day preconceptions by, at the same time, suggesting lines of continuities from the past. Taking a different path, there are attempts to pin down an essential core of definition which is found in – deep within -- systematic scholarship generally. This has been a particular preoccupation in general semiotics and formal logic: e.g., as intrinsic to meaning formation (Borsodi 1967), with corpora of definitions in hand (Barnbrook 2002), in terms of ‘definability’ in inferential systems (Fetzer, Shatz, Schlesinger eds. 1991) – and numerously in detailed studies of specific logic and semiotic systems (Frege’s, Saussure’s, Wittgenstein’s, Quine’s …). Along yet other lines, there are numerous stimulating attempts to hit upon the essence or core of areas of knowledge and of inclusive abstract concepts by defining them. Such ambitious attempts also throw light on the concept of defining itself, but tangentially. Such efforts focus on something within knowledge and knowing, rather than on knowledge and knowing in general. In this vein, there are studies galore of the definitions of philosophy, art, science, law, politics, literature, sociology, etc. and of such terms as ‘truth’, ‘justice’, ‘reason’, ‘theory’, ‘meaning’, ‘discourse’, ‘knowledge’, etc. … you name it, it has been attempted. Such approaches do not quite define definitions but put definitions into relief, as it were, by testing the boundaries of definitional possibility.

It seems to me that for the study of political catchwords, such searching scholarly attention to definition itself is not particularly serviceable. In such study the serviceability of definition is itself the nub, both for its own theoretical-practical undertaking and for contemplating the definitions of catchwords that are its objects of study. The serviceability of definitions according to the purpose at hand, including scholarship, and including our own scholarly efforts, appears to be the only locus for defining ‘definition’. Hence my opening gambit: A definition is an attempt to contain the fluidity of words in everyday language usage to facilitate a collective purpose – such as the practice of law, the governance of language usage, or the extension of scholarly knowledge. This approach is, in fact, a succinct extrapolation from John William Miller’s The Definition of the Thing (1980 [1922]).

Apart from that, definitions are contingent. Exploring the definitions of political catchwords as objects of study reveals the situated rationales that go into the formation, circulation and adaptations of social ideas and systems. For our purposes, definitions are most importantly trackable points for understanding how catchwords are taken up and spread at specific junctures, in the constantly bubbling interstices of social ideas and systems. They are perhaps best approached in terms of what Edward Schiappa calls ‘definitional discourse’. In this respect, there’s much in Schiappa’s Defining Reality (2003) that is serviceable for studying political catchwords.    

References

Barnbrook, Geoff (2002). Defining Language: A Local Grammar of Definition Sentences. John Benjamins.

Borsodi, Ralph (1967). The Definition of Definition: A New Linguistic Approach to the Integration of Knowledge. P. Sargent.

Chakrabarti, Kisor Kumar (1995). Definition and Induction: A Historical and Comparative Study. University of Hawaii Press.

Charles, David ed. (2010). Definition in Greek Philosophy. Oxford University Press.

Clark, Justin C. (2022). Plato’s Dialogues of Definition: Causal and Conceptual Investigations. Palgrave Macmillan.

Deslauriers, Marguerite (2007). Aristotle on Definition. Brill.

Fetzer, James H., David Shatz, George N. Schlesinger eds. (1991). Definitions and Definability: Philosophical Perspectives. Kluwer.

Kennedy-Day, Kiki (2003). Books of Definition in Islamic Philosophy: The Limits of Words. RoutledgeCurzon.

Miller, John Williams (1980). The Definition of the Thing, With Some Notes on Language. W.W. Norton.

Schiappa, Edward (2003). Defining Reality: Definitions and the Politics of Meaning. Southern Illinois University Press.

Image insert: Dr. Marcus Gossler, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons