Beyond the perennial periphery: understanding Europe in Sino-European relations

Author: Samuel Rogers

What is Europe?

At first glance, ‘Europe’ appears to be a clearly defined geographical space with obvious borders: the Atlantic to the West, the Arctic to the North, Asia to the East, and the Mediterranean to the South, with everything in the middle historically and culturally, Europe. Why then do so many people – from the ‘person on the street’ to the occupants of the highest political offices – continually conflate what is and is not Europe? Typically, confusion stems from the emergence and spread of what has become the European Union (EU) since its institutional beginnings after the Second World War. As a result of the creation of ‘Europe’ by the EU whether by accident or design, the ‘core’ EU countries (the wealthiest eurozone members) such as France and Germany have emerged as emblematic of what ‘Europe’ is and consequently administer what ‘Europe’ is not. Given the clear geographical borders above, however, this generates a skewed and one could say, dangerous conception of what Europe is (and is not). I argue such reified division stimulates and exacerbates two interrelated pancontinental issues: infrastructure inequality and divided attitudes towards China.

Why does this matter? Understanding what Europe is will help us better understand the changing dynamics of what we can broadly term Sino-European relations. I write ‘broadly’ because the content of these connexions is multifaceted and complicated, blurred not least by the abovementioned misconstruction of category. Chinese-financed infrastructure investment in Europe is a central component of these relations, which has become a fractious historical development replete with acrimony, contradictions, and misunderstanding. More discussion of what Europe is and subsequently how it interacts with Chinese-financed infrastructure projects will help policymakers, businesses, workers, and wider European societies shape their development.

Eastern Europe: the perennial periphery

One European region which has become synonymous with such ambiguities is what is commonly termed ‘post-socialist Europe’ or ‘Central and Eastern Europe’. Stretching from the Ural Mountains to the central German plains – the territorial bulk of the European continent – this highly diverse area is perpetually overlooked, underestimated, misunderstood, and stereotyped by the European ‘core’. The Western and Northern areas of Europe are rarely considered peripheral outside of the geographical sense of the word while the Southern regions became economically ‘peripheral’ following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. The East, however, has become what I call the perennial periphery. What was known as The Second World during the Cold War is now uncomfortably pigeonholed as somewhere between the ‘Global North’ and ‘Global South’; elsewhere labelled the ‘Global East’.

Let’s take the Donbas region as an example. A portmanteau of Donetsk and basin, this territory has a rich history dating back to antiquity: the setting for nomadic tribes, trade, war, and settled and unsettled peoples. A century ago, the Donbas was propagandised as ‘the heart of Russia’ due to its abundant coal reserves. Until February 2022, it was the scene of Europe’s deadliest conflict since the 1990s: a ‘cold’ war with a death toll of almost 15,000. Since this date, much of its territory has been recognised as independent by Russia: a precursor to its deadly and catastrophic invasion of Ukraine. Who took note of this eight-year struggle before the Russian offensive propelled the region into the global news? Despite the complexities surrounding the conflict – institutional differences, political egos, economic (in)capabilities etc. – the answer is clear: too few. In contrast, the so-called ‘Brexit’ process on the opposite side of the continent has been a mainstay in academia, ‘European’ policy, and national media outlets since 2016. Such imbalances speak to a lopsided, tiered Europeanness: those who are accepted (by the ‘core’) and those who are not, with the EU the de facto issuer of ‘European’ membership.

Enter China

What do such imbalances in the understanding of Europeanness by Europeans mean for Sino-European relations? The short answer is distorted and biased assumptions on how post-socialist Europe and China interact culturally, economically, and politically. Regularly, ‘Europe’ (the EU ‘core’) issues statements questioning and/or condemning post-socialist states’ engagement with China, often with the caveat that such interactions contain an existential threat to ‘Europe’, and this regardless of whether the countries involved are EU members or otherwise. The Belgrade-Budapest railway upgrade offers a case in point. The project, which traverses EU and non-EU territory is a key part of the EU’s TEN-T and Corridor X initiatives to address infrastructure inequalities across the Balkan peninsular and into Austria and Hungary. For the Hungarian section of the upgrade funding has arrived principally in the form of a loan from a Chinese state-owned bank. The institution will fund 85% of project value, equal to €1.68bn, with the remainder funded by the Hungarian state. Likewise, the Serbian section is also funded in large part via a loan from the same bank.

‘European’ condemnation of such projects reveals a hypocritical practice and misrepresentation of reality. France, Germany, and the UK – the so-called ‘Big 3’ – received over half of all Chinese investment into Europe in 2020 despite dramatic reductions due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Though this should not be seen as a simplistic, binary story, the ‘core’ has come to associate inward Chinese capital flows with an undermining of democratic institutions. This has resulted in (at least) two interrelated consequences: (1) increased screening of inward investment from China has been introduced piecemeal across European countries and (2) acrimony and suspicion has been directed from the ‘core’ towards the perennial periphery as a result of the latter’s development choices vis-à-vis inward Chinese infrastructure investment. What results is a continued reification of a ‘good West’ versus ‘bad East’ in the European context.

Looking forward

More discussion of what Europe is will generate more recognition of what Europe is. In turn, this will help bring in ‘the East’ from its reified periphery. Acknowledgement of Europe as a geographical area rather than a more limited political arena imbued with cultural misunderstandings will move towards more pancontinental cohesion. This will create a better appreciation of what Sino-European relations are, their content, and what they mean for European development. As a result, public policy will be more informed, business relations more transparent. In general terms, there will be less acrimony within the artificial East-West European split and regarding infrastructure, financing and funding will come less to be an ‘EU/‘Europe’ versus China’ issue and more a ‘Europe and China’ development tandem.

This is not inevitable, however: deep-seated inequalities remain, not least in infrastructure quality and access to it across Europe, which continue to undermine convergence. There are no guarantees, and it will be a long journey, but it is critical to start it. An obvious early result would be the stimulation of greater European solidarity; something the Russo-Ukrainian war has highlighted as missing. In a highly globalised world, a reduction in pancontinental misunderstanding is paramount for a smoother development trajectory, especially as Sino-European relations advance and become more complex, and Chinese-sourced capital continues to (attempt to) finance and fund infrastructure projects across the European continent.