Conference Themes

We sometimes seek to improve our conceptual repertoire, perhaps by revising our concepts or introducing brand new ones. This is called conceptual engineering. Interest in conceptual engineering has recently surged, driven in part by the sense that it could play a far bigger role in philosophical methodology than previously realised, but also by the realisation that the underlying mechanisms remain poorly understood (Cappelen, Pinder). On both fronts, there are important insights to be gained by examining conceptual engineering in connection with aesthetics.

Firstly, we can explore the role that conceptual engineering might play in aesthetics. Can conceptual engineering shed new light on important debates in aesthetics? Perhaps recent work on ‘fruitful concepts’ (Dutilh Novaes and Reck) could take forward the debate on the concepts of art (Dean) and aesthetic experience (Carroll, Levinson). Conversely, do aesthetic debates shed new light on the limits of conceptual engineering? Perhaps the concept of beauty is bedrock (Chalmers), or a ‘fixed point’ (Eklund), and therefore cannot be engineered. If so, what general lessons can be learnt?

Secondly, we can explore how aesthetics illuminates the mechanisms underlying conceptual engineering. Are some concepts more aesthetically pleasing than others and, if so, should this be a factor when choosing concepts? Can the idea of art as an essentially contested concept (Gallie) provide a new mechanism by which concepts might be revised? Can discussions on the moral and aesthetic values of art (Gaut) inform our understanding of the competing values and disvalues of socially problematic concepts (Haslanger)? Or perhaps work on ‘theory building’ in aesthetics (Walton) can illuminate some of the issues thrown up by conceptual engineering?

There are two key benefits to tackling such questions. On the one hand, extant debates in aesthetics can provide rich case studies for the conceptual engineer, clarifying and expanding her understanding of the methodology, and directing future debates in the field. On the other hand, conceptual engineering may prove to be a powerful but underused methodology that can cast new light on important aesthetic questions.

References:

• Cappelen, H. 2018. Fixing Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press
• Chalmers, D. 2011. Verbal disputes. Philosophical Review 120(4): 515–566
• Carroll, N. 2015. Defending the content approach to aesthetic experience. Metaphilosophy 46(2): 171-188
• Dean, J. T. 2003. The nature of concepts and the definition of art. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 61(1): 29-35
• Dutilh Novaes, C., and Reck, E. 2017. Carnapian explication, formalisms as cognitive tools, and the paradox of adequate formalization. Synthese 194(1): 195–215
• Eklund, M. 2017. Choosing Normative Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press
• Gallie, W.B. 1956. Art as an essentially contested concept. Philosophical Quarterly 6(23): 97–114
• Gaut, B. 2007. Art, Emotion and Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press
• Haslanger, S. 2012. Resisting Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press
• Levinson, J. 2006. Contemplating Art: Essays in Aesthetics. Oxford: Oxford University Press
• Pinder, M. 2019. Conceptual engineering, metasemantic externalism, and speaker-meaning. Mind. Doi: 10.1093/mind/fzz06
• Walton, K. 2007. Aesthetics – What? Why? And Wherefore? The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 65(2): 147-161.